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Cease-Fire Follows Israeli Division Over War Strategy

Monday, August 14, 2006

The longest war in Israel’s history appears to be taking its toll on unity within the government. It was not a surprise to see Israel acquiesce to the ceasefire that goes into effect Monday morning, even though the deal can only be interpreted as a win for Hezbollah and a shocking loss for Israel. That Israeli leadership accepted it reflects its succumbing to the immense and mounting pressure it faced over its offensive in Lebanon. Not only did the war have plenty of detractors around the world, but detractors were also beginning to emerge from the Israeli public. Even worse, reports also indicated a dangerous fracturing among Israel’s civilian and military leadership. The Israeli government has traditionally seen politicians across all party lines (and there are a lot of those in Israel) pull together in time of war. The current war, however—Israel’s longest since its independence in 1948—is creating some disagreements. Politicians and military leaders sparred over war strategy; some believe the offensive should end altogether. The contrast between the Israel that won decisive, lightning-fast victories in several previous wars and today’s Israel, which has visibly failed to defeat a fighting force of only a few thousand terrorists, is stark. Discontent within Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s Security Cabinet appeared in a vote last Wednesday, when three of the 12 ministers abstained, with two arguing for a diplomatic solution (a strategy that has proven a failure time after time) and the other pushing for reliance on air strikes against Hezbollah (which has not proven successful after four weeks) rather than risking troop casualties. Though at the time the cabinet decided to intensify Israeli operations anyway, Israel “delayed the start of the operation to give diplomats a few more days to work out a cease-fire, officials said” (Associated Press, August 10). The previous day saw a shake-up in the Israeli Defense Forces when Northern Command Chief Major-General Udi Adam was abruptly shifted away from the front line and replaced by Deputy idf Chief of Staff Major-General Moshe Kaplinksy—an awkward and radical change of command in the middle of a war. Some viewed Adam as a scapegoat sacrificed to deflect criticism from leaders higher up. Adam himself remarked that he had been restrained from fighting a truly effective war. Jonathan Ariel published a condemning analysis of the problem in Israel Insider on August 9. He said: Relations between the country’s political and military leadership are at the lowest point in the country’s history, on the verge of a crisis. In addition, there is a growing lack of confidence between Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, the first CoS to hail from the air force, and many of his general staff colleagues from the ground forces, who say he and his “blue clique” [blue being the color of the air force uniform—ed.] do not fully appreciate the nature of ground warfare. According to informed sources, there is an almost total breakdown in trust and confidence between the General Staff and [Olmert’s] office. Ariel describes a war plan the Israeli military has been perfecting for some two to three years—a swift, multifaceted offensive intended to break Hezbollah in 10 to 14 days—of which Olmert ditched all but certain components of the air attack. The subsequent difficulties Israel has encountered have understandably created immense frustration. Although the premier has yet to admit his decision, let alone provide a satisfactory explanation, it seems that he hoped futilely for a limited war. … Whatever his reasons, the bottom line, according to these military sources, is that he castrated the campaign during the crucial first days. The decision to not bomb Beirut immediately enabled Nasrallah [Hezbollah’s leader] to escape, first to his bunker, subsequently to the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. Knowing what we know of Olmert, the fact that there is a disconnect between him and the military leaders is unsurprising. Olmert was made prime minister by a slim percentage of Israeli voters after having campaigned on a pledge to extract tens of thousands of Jews from West Bank settlements. After winning, he made this inane pledge to Palestinian leaders: “We are ready to compromise, to give up parts of the beloved land of Israel … and evacuate, under great pain, Jews living there, in order to create the conditions that will enable you to fulfill your dream and live alongside us.” This only reinforced the point he made to the Israel Policy Forum in New York last June, “We are tired of fighting, we are tired of being courageous, we are tired of winning, we are tired of defeating our enemies” (emphasis ours). Not exactly the kind of language that fires up the troops for the lethal business of war making. Olmert’s jettisoning of the idf’s functional strategy—following air attacks with air and sea landing operations in order to outflank Hezbollah, taking advantage of Israel’s traditional strengths of surprise and rapid mobile warfare—is simply another manifestation of the same wishful thinking that makes the idea of retreating from the West Bank so attractive to him. Ariel continued, [A]ccording to military sources, Israel finds itself getting bogged down by a manifestly inferior enemy, due to the limitations placed on the idf by the political leadership. This has been construed by the enemy as a clear sign that Israel is in the hands of a leadership not up to the task, lacking the required experience, guts and willpower. For an Israeli leader to demonstrate such weakness is exceedingly dangerous. The margin of error is small for this little country, surrounded as it is by hostile neighbors with comparatively enormous populations. Israel’s clear military superiority is the only thing helping Israel to survive right now, and if it is used ineffectively, the strategic advantage it provides is lost. As Ariel put it, Seeing the once invincible idf being stalemated by Hezbollah’s 3,000 troops is a sure way to radiate an aura of weakness that in the Middle East could precipitate attacks by sharks smelling blood. Israel’s political disunion is easily and accurately perceived by its many foes as being a vulnerability, something to exploit. With the cease-fire now being implemented, some analysts said that, Olmert’s boasting over Israel’s “victory” notwithstanding, this war has been sufficiently botched that the prime minister’s days in office are already numbered. As Haaretz columnist Ari Shavit wrote, There is no mistake Ehud Olmert did not make this past month. He went to war hastily, without properly gauging the outcome. He blindly followed the military without asking the necessary questions. He mistakenly gambled on air operations, was strangely late with the ground operation, and failed to implement the army's original plan, much more daring and sophisticated than that which was implemented. And after arrogantly and hastily bursting into war, Olmert managed it hesitantly, unfocused and limp. He neglected the home front and abandoned the residents of the north. He also failed shamefully on the diplomatic front .... The day Nasrallah comes out of his bunker and declares victory to the whole world, Olmert must not be in the prime minister’s office. Post-war battered and bleeding Israel needs a new start and a new leader. It needs a real prime minister. Sadly, however, Israel has no strong leaders to fill the office. It appears the nation is about to be plunged into yet another political imbroglio. And the more divided the country is, the more its enemies will perceive the momentum in the war to be swinging in their favor—and the more determined they will become to hasten Israel’s demise.